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DENIAL OF NLRA PROTECTION FOR DISSIDENT
UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES AND LIMITATIONS UNDER
SECTION 704(a) OF TITLE VII-EMPORIUM CAPWELL
CO. V. WESTERN ADDITION COMMUNITY
ORGANIZA TION*
In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization,' the Supreme Court dealt a staggering blow to minority
workers who, despite a collective bargaining agreement with a no-strike
provision, picketed their employer to protest alleged racial discrimina-
tion. The Court characterized the unauthorized picketing as an attempt
to bargain over terms and conditions of employment in derogation of the
exclusive bargaining representative.' By denying the terminated em-
ployees protection under sections 73 and 8(a)(1)1 of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Court refused to accommodate the underlying princi-
ples of the NLRA to the pursuit of substantive Title VII rights.' The
Emporium decision not only precluded these employees from gaining
reinstatement and back pay through proceedings before the National
Labor Relations Board, but may also frustrate protection of self-help
activities under section 704(a) of Title VIIP This Note will analyze the
* This Note has benefited from the comments of Professor Elliott Goldstein, DePaul
College of Law.
1. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
2. Id. at 60-61. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1970) provides in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment ....
3. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 7 provides in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization ... to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion ....
4. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). Section 8(a)(1)
provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (Supp. III, 1973), prohibits discrimination by employers, employ-
ment agencies and labor organizations on the basis of an individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. The term "substantive Title VII rights" refers to the rights of
persons to be free from any prohibited discrimination.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. III, 1973). Section 704(a) provides:
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Emporium Court's reasoning and discuss its effect on subsequent inter-
pretations of section 704(a).
The series of events culminating in the Emporium decision began
with a list of grievances presented to the Department Store Employees
Union. After investigating the complaints, the Union concluded that the
company was discriminating and promised to process every grievance
through to arbitration if necessary. Four employees thought this was an
unsatisfactory approach to eliminate what they believed was a pattern
of racial discrimination. When their subsequent demand to meet sepa-
rately with top company officials fell on deaf ears, they picketed and
distributed handbills during non-working hours. The employees in-
volved were discharged for these activities.' Western Addition Com-
munity Organization, a civil rights group, filed charges against the
company, alleging that the terminations constituted violations of sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. The Board found that the activities of the
employees were unprotected and refused to reinstate them.'
Upon review, the court of appeals attempted to reconcile the anti-
discrimination policy embodied in Title VII with the demands of section
9(a) exclusivity? Under the court's standard, if a union failed to remedy
the alleged discrimination to the "fullest extent possible, by the most
expedient and efficacious means,"'' minority employees would be al-
lowed to bypass their bargaining agent and press their employer directly
for equal employment opportunity. The appellate court felt that the
national policy in favor of eliminating employment discrimination re-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment
agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or
other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discrimi-
nate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against
any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
7. For a detailed presentation of the facts in Emporium see Meltzer, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The More Remedies, The Better? 42 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1, 27-30 (1974).
8. Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173 (1971). The trial examiner, whose findings were
adopted by the Board, found that the dissident employees had attempted to bargain.
Section 7 protection was denied because their activities were violative of the exclusivity
principle in section 9(a).
9. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. Id. at 931. For critical discussions of the appellate court's opinion see Meltzer, supra
note 7; Note, Title VII and NLRA: Protection of Extra-Union Opposition to Employment
Discrimination, 72 MICH. L. REv. 313 (1973).
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quired that the picketing be accorded section 7 protection, even though
it might be somewhat disruptive of established collective bargaining
processes. The case was remanded for the Board to consider whether the
union had proceeded in the most efficacious manner."
THE Emporium COURT'S REASONING
In Emporium, both the appellate court and Supreme Court adopted
the Board's finding that the discharged employees had attempted to
bargain with the company over working conditions affecting minority
employees. 2 The appellate court asserted that the dissident employees'
acts could be protected concerted activity even though the activities
were characterized as attempts to bargain. 3 However, the Supreme
Court viewed the finding of an attempt to bargain as determinative of
whether section 7 protection could be extended to the concerted activity.
By labeling the activity as an attempt to bargain rather than a presenta-
tion of grievances," the Court deemed the dissidents' concerted activi-
ties too threatening to the collective bargaining process to warrant sec-
tion 7 protection. 5
11. 485 F.2d at 931. The appellate court standard was an attempt to insure that the
union would proceed in the most efficient manner. Efficiency, rather than good faith in
choosing a particular means, was the criterion. See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
12. 420 U.S. at 61; 485 F.2d at 929 n.34. The Board's finding of an attempt to bargain
was based upon evidence showing that the dissident employees would be satisfied with
nothing less than a meeting with the company president. They wanted to "talk to the top
management to get better conditions for The Emporium." 192 N.L.R.B. at 185.
13. 485 F.2d at 929. In his dissent, Justice Douglas agreed with the appellate court's
reasoning. He stressed that the principle of exclusive representation should not be applied
in cases of alleged racial discrimination because the right to nondiscriminatory treatment
is derived from law and does not depend upon union demands. 420 U.S. 73 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
14. If the employees were only attempting to present grievances, their actions would
have been protected under the first proviso to section 9(a), which reads:
That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as
the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect . ...
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). In their brief, the dissident
employees had argued that
[Tlheir protest was intended to publicize, and thus to induce response to, their
underlying grievance concerning discrimination. Viewed as either protest or
grievance, however, their conduct warranted protection under the Act.
Brief for Respondents at 30, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
15. 420 U.S. at 66-70.
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According to the Supreme Court, an employee who is represented by
an exclusive bargaining agent cannot pursue his or her substantive Title
VII rights in derogation of that agent. The Court discussed the following
points in reaching its conclusion: (1) activities in derogation of the ma-
jority representative undermine the very principles upon which labor
policy is founded;" (2) satisfactory safeguards to prevent tyranny of the
majority already exist;" (3) the grievance process adequately handles
discrimination disputes;'" (4) other means are available to the employee
who seeks to eliminate discrimination;" and (5) separate bargaining is
counterproductive to progress because of the chaos which it potentially
can generate. 0
The Emporium Court began its analysis by discussing the fundamen-
tal principle that an individual gains the advantage of collective
strength in return for relinquishing to the union the right to deal directly
with the employer. Majoritarian principles, firmly established in NLRB
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.," were applied to justify adher-
ence to traditionally acceptable methods of dealing with the employer.
Since majority rule and exclusive representation most effectively ac-
complish improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions for
all," the Court concluded that dissident employees should not be al-
lowed to undermine this process.
According to the Emporium Court, the power of the majority is
checked in several ways. Appropriate units for collective bargaining,"
the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act, 4 and the union's duty of fair representa-
16. Id. at 62-64. See text accompanying notes 21-22 infra.
17. Id. at 64. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text infra.
18. Id. at 66-67. See text accompanying note 30 infra.
19. Id. at 70. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text infra.
20. Id. at 67-69. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text infra.
21. 388 U.S. 175 (1967). In Allis-Chalmers, the union imposed fines upon members who
had refused to honor the union's picket lines and then sued to collect the unpaid fines.
The Supreme Court held that the union had not violated section 8(b)(1)(A). This section,
which was added to the National Labor Relations Act in 1947, provides that it shall be
an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
22. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
23. Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970), pro-
vides for Board decisions on what constitutes an appropriate unit. See Allied Chem.
Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 171.72 (1971).
24. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1970). The Act insures that unions are operated in a democratic manner. The Bill of
Rights, sections 411-15, provides that each member shall enjoy equal voting rights, par-
ticipation in deliberations, and freedom of speech and assembly. Section 412 makes these
rights enforceable through a civil action in federal district court. For a complete discussion
[Vol. 25:179
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tion"i reconcile union strength and the individual's rights. However, the
duty of fair representation, in particular, has shortcomings which the
Court failed to consider. This duty is breached when a union's conduct
toward a member of the unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith." Minority employees, taking issue with the manner in which the
union protests the employer's discriminatory practices, implicitly have
no recourse through the duty of fair representation unless the union acts
in bad faith." This was the dilemma facing the dissident employees in
Emporium. In their estimation, processing individual grievances to re-
dress the alleged sweeping, company-wide discrimination was hope-
lessly inadequate."8 However, if the union's decision to process individ-
ual grievances was not made in bad faith, the dissidents' belief that
their union representatives had failed to press far enough probably
would not have been enforced through the duty of fair representation. 9
of the Bill of Rights see Beyer, Title I of the LMRDA: Rights and Remedies of Union
Members with Respect to Their Unions, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 258 (1975). See also Schneid-
mann, Application and Limitation of Union Power, 22 LAB. L.J. 424, 437 (1971).
25. The duty to fairly represent every member in the bargaining unit was first articu-
lated in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the Board first held
that a union's breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice violating
section 8(b).
26. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150
N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837
(1967). United Rubber Workers dealt with a union's summary refusal to process discrimi-
nation grievances. The fifth circuit held that arbitrary treatment or inaction constitutes
a breach of the duty of fair representation. However, the court stated that if a union makes
a good faith investigation of the merits and decides not to proceed, the duty is satisfied.
Id. at 17.
27. For a complete discussion of the duty of fair representation see Comment, Fair
Representation and Breach of Contract in Section 301 Employee-Union Suits: Who's
Watching the Back Door? 122 U. PA. L. REV. 714 (1974); Comment, Post-Vaca Standards
of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation: Consolidating Bargaining Units, 19 VILL. L.
REV. 885 (1974).
28. 420 U.S. at 54. The collective bargaining agreement contained a clause prohibiting
employment discrimination and providing that violations could be processed through the
grievance procedure. Id. at 53.
29. Justice Douglas indicated that the dissident employees would probably not prevail
in a suit against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. He said, "They
theoretically had a cause of action against their Union. . . . But as the law on that phase
of the problem has evolved it would seem that the burden on the employee is heavy." 420
U.S. at 73-74 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The appellate court also addressed the inadequacy of the duty of fair representation for
the Emporium employees. "Yet, even where there might be no bad faith on the part of
the union, we recognize that the method chosen by a union might not be the most effica-
cious or expedient." 485 F.2d at 931. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
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The Supreme Court disagreed with the dissident employees regarding
the adequacy of filing individual grievances. Processing separate claims
can be effective, according to the Court, because "one would hardly
expect an employer to continue in effect an employment practice that
routinely results in adverse arbitral decisions.""0
In addition, the Court stressed the availability of other avenues
through which the employer's alleged discrimination could be chal-
lenged. The administrative processes of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC)3 as. well as a class action pursuant to Title
VIP 2 could be utilized. Also, recent interpretations of the NLRA have
affirmatively involved labor law in the struggle against employment
discrimination. 3 According to the Court, these developments supply
satisfactory alternatives for the dissident employees in Emporium and
render unauthorized attempts to bargain unnecessary.
Not only was the picketing in Emporium deemed inessential to the
pursuit of racial equality on the job, but it was also characterized as
counterproductive to that end. The Court stated that unauthorized con-
certed activity can divide the employees and pit one group against the
other.3' In addition, the Court noted that the employer has a legitimate
interest in seeing that strife does not result from fragmentation of the
30. 420 U.S. at 67.
31. Id. at 65 n.16, 70, 72. The procedures to be followed when presenting a complaint
to the EEOC are set forth in section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
5 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (Supp. 11, 1973). Some of the problems encoun-
tered in utilizing the EEOC processes are discussed in notes 71-75 and accompanying text
infra.
32. Under Title VII, discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin is considered class discrimination by definition. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th
Cir. 1968).
33. See United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 903 (1969) (employer discrimination :on the basis of race or national origin
violates section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because such discrimination inherently interferes
with an employee's section 7 rights). But cf., Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973),
enforced, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Board, rejecting United Packinghouse rationale,
held in a sex discrimination case that an employee must demonstrate an actual nexus
between discriminatory act and alleged interference with section 7 rights). For a discus-
sion approving of the Board's standard in Jubilee see Note, Employer Discrimination:
How Far Does NLRB Jurisdiction Reach? 59 CORNELL L. REv. 1078 (1974).
In a parallel development, not referred to by the Emporium court, the processes of the
NLRB have been withheld from unions which discriminate. See NLRB v. Mansion House
Center Mgmt. Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973); Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211
N.L.R.B. No. 7 (June 7, 1974).
34. 420 U.S. at 67. But see Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The
Causes and Functions of Industrial Civil Disobedience, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 751 (1973).
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unit, and the union has an obvious interest in maintaining a cohesive
front. 5 If minority employees are permitted to economically coerce the
employer to adopt new procedures, others, who must resort to the griev-
ance procedure, will resent the group receiving favored treatment. The
Court's view was that under such circumstances "headway against dis-
criminatory practices would be minimal"3 because of the disrupted
bargaining order.
Assumptions concerning the subversion of industrial harmony if sepa-
rate bargaining and economic coercion by a minority group is allowed
underscored the Court's opinion. Without the emphasis on the potential
conflict that can result when the established channels are circumvented,
the Court might have construed the unauthorized activity as supportive
of, instead of derogating from, the union's position.37 The union in
Emporium had opposed the company's racially discriminatory prac-
tices; the actions of the four protestors could have been deemed a consis-
tent extension of the union's stance. 38
The Emporium Court's choice of priorities closely resembled those in
NLRB v. Draper Corp.3" There the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to extend protection to minority workers who engaged in a wild-
cat strike. Although the strike was mobilized to protest a delay in nego-
tiations and to give unsolicited support to the union's position, the court
characterized the strike as disruptive to the designated representative's
authority and the collective bargaining process. The picketing under-
taken in Emporium did not interfere with production as did the strike
in Draper. However, the exclusivity principle was used to limit the scope
of section 7 protected concerted activity in both cases.4"
35. 420 U.S. at 70.
36. Id. at 69.
37. See NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1974) (protection extended to
employees who engaged in unauthorized strike when the employer was not forced to choose
between the demands of the union and the splinter qroup); Western Contracting Corp. v.
NLRB, 322 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963). But see NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419
F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965)
(same case) (protection denied where employees failed to first seek union assistance to
eradicate racial discrimination prior to their protest).
38. The appellate court in Emporium took that position. "[W]e find it significant that
the Union and the petitioners were not working at cross-purposes, but were both attempt-
ing to eradicate racially discriminatory employment practices." 485 F.2d at 930.
39. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944), discussed in Comment, Majority Participation Factor
in Wildcat Strikes, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 683 (1973). See also Medo Photo Supply Corp.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) (first case to apply the exclusivity principle under the
NLRA). In both Draper and Medo, the power of the majority representative was consoli-
dated, rank and file dissent being relegated to intra-union channels. Emporium is a
further extension of this policy.
40. For a discussion criticizing the extension of exclusivity in this manner see Schatzki,
1975]
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IMPACT OF Emporium ON SECTION 704(a)
The most significant question raised by the Emporium decision is
whether protection for unauthorized concerted activity opposing dis-
crimination will now be precluded under section 704(a) of Title VfII.
Prior to Emporium, section 704(a) presented a potential source of pro-
tection from employer retaliation against employees protesting discrimi-
natory practices. In Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. ,"2 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that the purpose of section 704(a) is
"to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to
protect his rights."'3 The employee had been terminated because he
filed charges with the EEOC. This retaliatory firing was deemed viola-
tive of section 704(a). Although Pettway did not discuss the scope of
protection afforded by 704(a) or whether acts, other than filing charges,
in opposition to employment discrimination should be shielded from
employer retaliation, one footnote expounding upon the breadth of sec-
tion 704(a)" has been cited in EEOC decisions as authority for a broad
interpretation."'
Two EEOC decisions are of particular interest because they dealt with
employee activity proscribed by a collective bargaining agreement yet
Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should
Exclusivity Be Abolished? 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897 (1975).
41. The text of the statute is set forth in note 6 supra. Section 704(a) proscribes em-
ployer retaliation against employees who, on the basis of a good faith belief, oppose
practices which may unlawfully discriminate. Protection is not conditioned on a finding
that any such practices actually exist. See EEOC Decision No. 71-1115, 1973 CCH EEOC
DECISIONS 6201 (Jan. 11, 1971); EEOC Decision No. 71-2374, 1973 CCH EEOC DECISIONS
6260 (June 3, 1971). For a complete discussion of section 704(a) see Spurlock, Proscribing
Retaliation Under Title VII, 8 IND. L. Rav. 453 (1975).
42. 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. Id. at 1005.
44. The protective provisions of Title VII are substantially broader than even
those included in the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act in that, in addition to protecting charges and testimony, Title VII also
specifically protects assistance and participation. This indicates the exception-
ally broad protection intended for protestors of discriminatory employment
practices. The protection of assistance and participation in any manner would
be illusory if employer could retaliate against employee for having assisted or
participated in a Commission proceeding.
411 F.2d at 1006 n.18.
45. See EEOC Decision No. 72-1114, 1973 CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6347 (February 18,
1972). An employee who attempted to call a meeting and walkout to protest the religious
statements of his supervisor was wrongfully discharged by his employer in violation of
section 704(a). The Pettway footnote was cited for the proposition that section 704(a) was
intended to provide exceptionally broad protection for protestors of discriminatory prac-
tices. See also EEOC Decision No. 73-0519, 2 CCH EMP. PRAC. G. 6388 (June 1, 1973).
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undertaken to protest an employer's discriminatory practices. Both de-
cisions stated that the right to oppose discrimination by protesting is not
affected by a collective bargaining agreement with a no-strike clause. In
one case, 46 an employee had established a one-man picket line in front
of his employer's plant to protest discriminatory practices. He was fired
for violating the no-strike provision in the contract but was later rein-
stated pursuant to an EEOC finding that terminating this employee
violated section 704(a). In the other EEOC decision, 4 several women
employees refused to report to work in a protest against discriminatory
employment policies. Although the refusal violated the collective bar-
gaining agreement, it was held to be protected activity under section
704(a). These decisions demonstrate that prior to Emporium, section
704(a) was successfully utilized to protect activities other than filing
charges, even in the face of a collective bargaining agreement.
Furthermore, dicta in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green" referred to
section 704(a) as relating "to discrimination against an applicant or
employee on account of his participation in legitimate civil rights activ-
ities or protests . . . ."" This reference indicates that the Supreme
Court did not construe section 704(a) as restricted to protection for filing
charges. The Court's statement regarding 704(a), read in conjunction
with the Pettway footnote and the EEOC interpretations discussed
above, strongly suggests that before Emporium, section 704(a) included
protection for picketing and protesting as well as filing charges. 0
46. EEOC Decision No. 71-1804, 1973 CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6264 (April 19, 1971).
Justice Douglas expressed agreement with this EEOC finding in his dissent in Emporium.
420 U.S. at 74 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
47. EEOC Decision No. 74-56, 2 CCH EMP. PRAC. G. 6438 (Nov. 16, 1973).
48. 411 U.S. 792 (1973), discussed in Note, Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimi-
nation Cases-McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 654 (1974).
49. Id. at 799. The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas had participated in an illegal protest
to oppose the company's alleged discriminatory practices. In that protest, stalled cars were
used to block the main roads leading to the company plant during the morning shift
change. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this activity was beyond the
purview of section 704(a). Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972),
vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme Court did not review this
finding, but dealt primarily with the order and nature of proof required of the plaintiff
bringing a private, non-class action suit pursuant to sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of Title
VII. Although the 704(a) claim was properly dismissed, the Court found that the dismissal
of plaintiff's 703(a)(1) claim was harmful error because the issues raised in the 703(a)(1)
action were not identical to those in the 704(a) suit.
50. But see Meltzer, supra note 7, at 37-38. Meltzer argued that Title VII promotes its
policy within a framework of procedural protections and thus it is unlikely that section
704(a) protection would cover picketing. However, the Emporium court indicated that the
scope of section 704(a) protection was not conclusively decided in Pettway and McDonnell
Douglas. 420 U.S. at 71 n. 25.
1975]
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The Emporium decision may now prevent protection under section
704(a) for a dissident minority of union members that pickets the em-
ployer in an attempt to eradicate alleged racial discrimination. The
Court in Emporium advised, "[i]f the discharges in this case are viola-
tive of §704(a) of Title VII, the remedial provisions of that title provide
the means by which Hollins and Hawkins may recover their jobs with
back pay."" As the EEOC decisions reflect,5" 704(a) was being inter-
preted to protect employees who picketed to protest discrimination
despite a no-strike provision. However, the Emporium decision may
impede that line of decisions as precedent. Protecting such picketing,
undertaken to bargain directly with the employer, in a Title VII forum"
would frustrate the Emporium decision and directly contradict its
stated policy preferences.
The following hypothetical illustrates the effect of extending section
704(a) protection to employees, such as Hollins and Hawkins, who have
attempted to bargain outside the established channels. Faced with sev-
eral picketing employees who are expressing their opposition to alleged
discriminatory practices, an employer probably would not fire the em-
ployees to halt the picketing if it is clear that reinstatement and back
pay would be ordered by a court pursuant to. 704(a). This employer
would either endure the dissidents' picketing for an indefinite period or
take concrete strides to correct the alleged discriminatory practices so
that the picketing and resultant economic harm would cease.54 However,
the Supreme Court has refused to sanction the process whereby racial
discrimination is eliminated as a result of an employer's capitulation to
the demands of minority workers in an organized unit. The Emporium
decision held that once a collective bargaining framework has been es-
tablished an employer need not be subjected to the demands of dissident
employees engaged in unauthorized activity." When, under the pressure
of section 704(a), the hypothetical employer responds to the dissident
employees by changing his or her employment policies, the process of
change condemned in Emporium would occur. Because the Emporium
Court held that the improvement of working conditions, including im-
provements derived from the implementation of fair employment prac-
51. 420 U.S. at 72.
52. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
53. The term "Title VII forum," as used herein, refers to proceedings before the EEOC
and/or the courts to enforce the rights guaranteed by Title VII.
54. An analogous situation was presented in NLRB v. Draper Corp, 145 F.2d 199 (4th
Cir. 1944), discussed in note 39 and accompanying text supra. The court stressed that if
protection were extended to the wildcat strikers they would have more leverage than the
other employees in the unit and wotild be able to pressure the employer.
55. 420 U.S. at 68-69.
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tices, is the exclusive duty of the bargaining agent,5" Title VII forums
will probably refuse to protect dissident employees who have circum-
vented the bargaining agent in an attempt to eradicate racial discrimi-
nation. In practical terms, the manner in which section 704(a) rights can
be exercised by dissident employees such as those in Emporium will
probably be limited as a result of the importance of exclusivity and the
preference for arbitration of all labor disputes."
It is equally unlikely that unionized dissidents, who merely picket
without making verbal bargaining demands,58 will enjoy section 704(a)
protection for their activities. Assume these employees go directly to a
Title VII forum and are not encumbered by an NLRB determination
that they attempted to bargain. The issue of whether they did, in effect,
attempt to bargain in derogation of the exclusive agent would probably
still be raised. In the Title VII forum the employer would no doubt argue
that the employees' picketing has a coercive effect even though no de-
mands have been issued."9 The employer would also contend that he or
she must deal with both the union and the picketing employees on the
question of racial discrimination. Since, according to Emporium, the
employer should not be put in this position where a binding agreement
is in effect, 0 the employer would argue that section 704(a) protection
cannot be extended without directly contradicting the Emporium deci-
sion. At that point, the Title VII forum would probably defer to the
NLRB, and would not extend section 704(a) protection unless the Board
found that the employees had not attempted to bargain."
56. Id. at 69-70. The Court's reasoning in arriving at this conclusion is discussed in notes
21-22 and accompanying text supra.
57. For articulation of the policy favoring arbitration of disputes see United Steelwork-
ers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Ameri-
can Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The policy has been expanded in recent years. See Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), discussed in Note, Labor
Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARv. L. REv. 636
(1972); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), noted in 76 W.
VA. L. REV. 249 (1974).
58. The employees in Emporium had made verbal bargaining demands in addition to
picketing. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
59. The Title VII forum is likely to recognize that the picketing has a coercive effect on
the employer. Picketing is equally coercive whether the employees' purpose is to bargain
with the employer or merely to express opposition to alleged unlawful discrimination.
60. 420 U.S. at 68-69.
61. Dissident minority employees, who picket without making verbal bargaining de-
mands will probably fight an uphill battle at the NLRB. Section 7 protection will most
likely be withheld from employees who picket in derogation of a bargaining representative.
Picketing, in and of itself, will most likely be deemed an attempt to bargain. See note 59
supra. To do otherwise would permit the existence of two pressure groups, the union and
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The foregoing discussion points out that protection under 704(a) for
dissident unionized employees who picket in violation of a no-strike
provision will probably not be forthcoming after Emporium. However,
section 704(a) protection for non-unionized employees who picket their
employer to protest racially discriminatory employment practices has
arguably not been prevented by the Emporium decision. According to
the Emporium Court, when employees enter into a collective bargaining
agreement they relinquish their right to deal directly with their em-
ployer and must rely on the union to represent their interests." How-
ever, in the absence of a labor agreement, employees can protest racial
discrimination without undermining the authority of a bargaining
agent.6 3 Section 704(a) protection, potentially available to all employees
prior to Emporium,"' can still be extended to non-unionized employees
without contradicting the Emporium Court's assertion that changes in
terms and conditions of employment must be confined to the collective
bargaining framework.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as the Emporium Court has determined that existing ad-
ministrative and judicial remedies adequately protect the rights of mi-
nority workers, these alternatives should be extended to accommodate
the intensified need which now exists. The rights guaranteed to mem-
bers of a union by the Landrum-Griffin Act" and the duty imposed upon
a union to fairly represent all of its members" should be liberally con-
the picketing minority group. This factor will probably preclude protection for picketing
unionized employees after Emporium, whether it is sought under the NLRA or Title VII.
62. 420 U.S. at 63, quoting from NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180
(1967). See also Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Local 2548, Textile Workers, 391 F. Supp. 287 (D.R.I.
1975). The Ciba-Geigy court held that a majority of employees may bargain away a
minority's right to refuse, on the basis of religious beliefs, to work on Sunday. The court
cited Allis-Chalmers and Emporium in deciding that the state's interest in maintaining
the majoritarian principle, with its built-in protections for minorities, overrides the bur-
den that Sunday work assignments place on the individual. Id. at 301.
63. Peaceful concerted activity protesting racial discrimination has been protected in
similar situations. See generally New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S.
552 (1938) (non-employees); Washington State Serv. Employees, 188 N.L.R.B. 957
(1971)(protests not directed against own employer, but another); Mason-Rust, 179
N.L.R.B. 434 (1969), enforcement denied on other grounds, 449 F.2d 425 (8th Cir.
1971)(applicants for employment).
64. See notes 42-50 and accompanying text supra.
65. See note 24 supra; Cloke, Labor Democracy, Free Speech and the Right of Rank
and File Insurgency, 4 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 1 (1975).
66. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
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strued. Following United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB,17 which
deemed an employer's discriminatory acts to be per se violative of sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA, the meaning of unfair labor practices should be
expanded to include an employer's discriminatory acts." The courts and
the Board should reject the more restrictive standard, in which an ac-
tual nexus between the discriminatory act and the alleged interference
with section 7 rights must be demonstrated." These suggestions would
allow greater utilization of the NLRA where racial discrimination is
concerned.
Prior to Emporium, commentators warned that utilizing the NLRA
to enforce rights which are derived from Title VII distorts the applica-
tion of both Acts and is entirely unnecessary."0 However, as demon-
strated in this Note, preserving the integrity of the collective bargaining
construct can restrict the methods available to protect statutory rights
guaranteed to all workers by Title VIf. The judicial limitation of section
704(a), which will probably take place following the Emporium decision,
will further weaken Title VII. This legislation has already been criticized
for its inadequacy.71 The Emporium case, like many others, was brought
to the Board because faster relief and enforceable administrative orders
are available there." By contrast, the EEOC is burdened by a tremen-
dous backlog73 and must ultimately depend upon the parties' willingness
to conciliate. 4 This policy of voluntary compliance should be re-
67. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969), discussed in note 33
supra.
68. For a complete discussion of this issue see Doppelt, Employer Racial Discrimina-
tion: Reviewing the Role of the NLRB, 8 U. oF MICH. J.L. REFORM 453 (1975).
69. The restrictive standard was announced by the Board in Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202
N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), enforced, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), discussed in note 33 supra.
70. See Meltzer, supra note 7; Note, Protected Activity-Concerted Activities to
Achieve Racially Nondiscriminatory Employment Conditions are Protected by the NLRA
Even Though Unauthorized by the Union, 87 HAav. L. REV. 656 (1974); Note, Racial
Discrimination in Employment and the Remedy of Self-Help: An Unwarranted Addition,
15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 615 (1974); But see Comment, The Inevitable Interplay of Title
VII and the National Labor Relations Act: A New Role for the NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
158 (1974).
71. See, e.g., Doppelt, supra note 68; Note, supra note 10.
72. See Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
Preliminary Study in Federal-State Interagency Relations, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 846, 887
(1966).
73. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Annual Report cov-
ering the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, there were 20,585 charges brought forward from
the previous year and 28,337 charges newly received. Investigations were completed on
only 10,668 of the above 48,922 charges. Decisions were issued or settlements reached in
even fewer cases. 7 EEOC ANN. REP. 36-38 (fiscal 1972). See also Doppelt, supra note 68.
74. After an investigation shows that there is reasonable cause to believe a charge is
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evaluated by Congress. When the EEOC can issue enforceable orders,
it will provide a more viable avenue for redress." The improvement of
existing channels, to insure that they are not merely theoretical, is the
very least that must be done before discriminatory employment prac-
tices can become an anachronism in this decade.
Roberta S. Brown
true, the statute directs the EEOC to attempt to eliminate the problem through informal
means such as conciliation and persuasion. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
§ 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1970). If conciliation fails, the EEOC is empowered to bring a civil suit against an
employer who is not a government, governmental agency or political subdivision. If the
EEOC fails to file suit, or the charge is dismissed, or the Attorney General has failed to
act against a governmental body, the person aggrieved must be notified. Within 90 days
of receipt of the notice, the aggrieved individual may bring a civil action against the party
named in the charge. Id. § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
75. As originally proposed, the EEOC would have been empowered to issue enforceable
orders. See H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1963). This proposal was stricken from
the original bill in a congressional compromise. For suggestions on improving the EEOC
as it is currently structured, see Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Op-
portunity: Incisive Administration or Indecisive Bureaucracy, 49 NoTE DAME LAW. 46
(1973); Comment, EEOC Regulatory Intervention: An Undeveloped Means of Enforcing
Title VII, 62 GEO. L.J. 1753 (1974).
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